With the deepening of the research on the issue of corporate social responsibility, the relationship among the government, enterprise and society has become the hotspot of researches. It has great practical significance to analyze the dynamic game relationship among the three parties under the incomplete information condition. Based on this, the three-party evolutionary game model under the incomplete information condition and the hypothesis of bounded rational participants has been built, and the behavioral strategies and earnings of the three-party participants as well as the evolutionarily stable strategy have been analyzed. Besides, the three-dimensional stereogram is applied to demonstrate the gradually progressive trend of different strategy profiles; and the game results suggest that the government chooses the intervention strategy, enterprise chooses the social responsibility fulfillment strategy, and society chooses the supervision strategy reaches the optimal status of the model, and can better promote the enterprise to fulfill social responsibility.
Social Responsibility, Evolutionary Game Model, Replicator Dynamics, Stable Strategy
At the point of finishing this paper, I wish to express my heartfelt gratitude to jiang yi, wei dong, for their gracious guidance and assistance, invaluable suggestions, pertinent criticisms and constant encouragement, without which this thesis would be impossible.
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