Security of Multimodal Hazmat Transports: Empirical Findings and Future Directions

Security of Multimodal Hazmat Transports: Empirical Findings and Future Directions

Genserik L.L. Reniers 

Antwerp Research Group on Safety and Security (ARGoSS), University of Antwerp, Prinsstraat, Antwerp

Centre for Economics and Corporate Sustainability (CEDON), HUB, KULeuven, Stormstraat, Brussels

Page: 
69-79
|
DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.2495/SAFE-V2-N1-69-79
Received: 
N/A
|
Accepted: 
N/A
|
Published: 
30 March 2012
| Citation

OPEN ACCESS

Abstract: 

This article investigates and questions in what ways the management methods and mathematical approaches, which are available for taking effective security measures in case of hazmat transportation, can be enhanced and whether they are adequately applied in industrial practice. After all, transportation of dangerous goods is a highly complex problem characterized with multi-modality and with multiple stakeholders and decision makers. Empirical findings, for example, suggest that companies transport-ing hazardous materials do not consider security to be an essential decision-influencing parameter, for example, as regard the option to choose for multi-modal transportation. This paper explains three possible ways to advance academic research (and to link it with industrial practice) in this ever more important societal domain of interest: multi-criteria modeling, game-theoretical modeling, and the use of meta-heuristics.

Keywords: 

Dangerous freights, Hazmat transports, multimodal transports, security

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