Cognitive Radios - A Solution for Dilemma Between Competition, Pricing and Practicality with Queuing Theory Approach

Cognitive Radios - A Solution for Dilemma Between Competition, Pricing and Practicality with Queuing Theory Approach

Avijit BosePrasenjit Das Sumit Majumdar 

Computer Sceince and Engineering, MCKV Institute of Engineering, Liluah, Howrah 711204, India

Computer Sceince and Engineering, MCKV Institute of Engineering, Liluah, Howrah 711204, India

Computer Sceince and Engineering, MCKV Institute of Engineering, Liluah, Howrah 711204, India

Corresponding Author Email: 
avi_bose@yahoo.com; mr.das.prasenjit@gmail.com; sm071985@gmail.com
Page: 
137-147
|
DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.18280/ama_d.220110
Received: 
October 2017
| |
Accepted: 
31 December 2017
| | Citation

OPEN ACCESS

Abstract: 

Pricing plays an important role in Network dynamics. In Cognitive Radio there are two classes- licensed and unlicensed users. So in this paper a mathematical model is derived trying to show the effect of competition can lead to channel allocation problem at the cost of revenue. Though the model reaches Nash Equilibrium but MM1/Q model really gives an idea how channel allocation problem is giving rise to Cognitive theory concept.

Keywords: 

Dynamic Spectrum Allocation, Cognitive Radio, Queuing theory, Profit margin.

1. Introduction
2. Problem Statement Regarding Competition
3. Proposed Mathematics Depicting the Dilemma
4. Game Theory and Nash Equilibrium
5. Proof with Queuing Theory WhyCognitive Radio is Required?
6. Conclusions
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