Based on traditional H-M principal-agent model and introduction of specific task ability, optimal incentive model with the specific task ability is established. the first best contract under symmetric information and the second best contract under asymmetric information are given. And the better specific task ability is, the higher incentive intensity is; the higher the risk aversion level and uncertainty are, the lower incentive intensity is.
Multi-task, Principal-agent, Incentive Contract.
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