Modélisation de valeurs humaines : le cas des vertus dans les jeux hédoniques

Modélisation de valeurs humaines : le cas des vertus dans les jeux hédoniques

Thibaut Vallée Grégory Bonnet Thibault de Swarte  

Normandie Université, UNICAEN, GREYC, CNRS UMR 6072

Normandie Université, UNICAEN, GREYC, CNRS UMR 6072

IMT Atlantique, Idea Lab LASCO-IMT, UBL, F-35576 Cesson-Sévigné Cedex

Corresponding Author Email: 
thibaut.vallee@unicaen.fr; gregory.bonnet@unicaen.fr; thibault.deswarte@imt-atlantique.fr
Page: 
519-546
|
DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.3166/ria.32.519-546
Received: 
|
Accepted: 
|
Published: 
31 August 2018
| Citation

OPEN ACCESS

Abstract: 

In many applicative contexts, several autonomous artificial agents must interact, make decision and cooperate in a collective way. In those contexts, an agent must not only take into account ethical criterion to reach its goals but also need to decide how it will cooperate and how it will take the other agents’ goals into account. Thus, in this article, we are interested by modeling a virtue ethics, ie. which aims at supporting a cardinal moral value, for collective formation. To this end, we propose a new model of coalition formation, called deviation hedonic games, where each agent decides which coalition it will form according to a set of atomic behavioral rules. Then we show how those rules can be combined in order to represent a plurality of values. As examples, we model three values – liberty, altruism and hedonism – which allow us to characterize new solution concepts.

Keywords: 

coalitions, human values, multi-agent systems, virtue ethics

1. Introduction
2. État de l’art
3. Des jeux de déviations
4. Modéliser les valeurs humaines
5. Conclusion et perspectives
Remerciements
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