Hedonic coalition games with multiple solution concepts

Hedonic coalition games with multiple solution concepts

Thibaut Vallée Grégory Bonnet  

Normandie Université, UNICAEN, GREYC, CNRS UMR 6072, France

Corresponding Author Email: 
thibaut.vallee@unicaen.fr,gregory.bonnet@unicaen.fr
Page: 
169-195
|
DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.3166/RIA.32.169-195
Received: 
|
Accepted: 
|
Published: 
30 April 2018
| Citation

OPEN ACCESS

Abstract: 

In multiagent systems, agents may be led to ask themselves with whom to cooperate, knowing that each of them expresses its own preferences. This problem is studied in hedonic games with solution concepts characterizing the stability of outcomes with respect to the agents’ preferences. However, this framework considers a single a priori about agents’ common behaviour. For instance, Nash stability models agents which all want to join the coalitions they prefer without any considerations about the others. Thus, it might also interesting to consider agents which are heterogeneous in their definition of stable solutions. For this purpose, we propose two news hedonic game models. The first one where agents decide the solution concept that they follow, the second one where agents express preferences on the coalitions and the solution concepts.  

Keywords: 

behavior models, coalitions, game theory

1. Introduction
2. Jeux hédoniques canoniques
3. Concepts de solution locaux
4. Des préférences sur les concepts
5. Conclusion et perspectives
Remerciements
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